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In this Essay, we examine the reasons why the
economic analysis of law has not flourished in
European countries as it has in the United States. In
particular, we focus on three European countries-the
United Kingdom, Germany, and France. We argue
that differences in culture, the legal system, and the
academy have led to differing degrees of success of
the law and economics movement in each country. We
speculate that, although there is currently less interest
in the economic analysis of the law in Europe than in
the United States, European interest could
dramatically increase if scholars adopt more
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communitarian analyses aimed at analyzing
legislative polices rather than judicial decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The economic analysis of law enjoys a long and proud
tradition in the United States and is firmly rooted in its legal system. 1
The growth of the "law and economics movement" in the American
legal environment has been compared to the release of the rabbit in
Australia: "[E]conomics found a vacant niche in the 'intellectual
ecology' of the law and rapidly filled it."2  Although initially
confined to areas like antitrust and regulated industries, thanks to the
pioneering scholarship of academic luminaries such as Gary Becker,
1. The beginning of the modem law and economics movement in the United States is
generally traced to the seminal articles of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi in the early
1960s. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (using
economic principles to analyze nuisance law); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (discussing the distribution of
economic losses in tort law).
2. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (3d ed. 2000).
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Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Guido Calabresi, the American
law and economics movement has permeated almost every nook and
cranny of the American legal landscape, including criminal law,
family law, employment discrimination, and procedural law.3
If the success of the application of economic analysis to legal
problems in the United States can be compared to that of the rabbits
released in Australia, the law and economics movement in Europe
might best be compared to the experience of the camels that were
released into the American southwest.4 Although the economic
analysis of law has been of some interest to European scholars, it
seems curiously out of place in their work and, so far, the discipline
has not been successfully transplanted to the European academic
ecosystem. 5 Indeed, Professor Dau-Schmidt's experience has been
that the primary interest of European legal scholars in the economic
analysis of law is for use as a window into the American legal mind,
rather than for purposes of applying the same principles in the
analysis of European laws. The impact of the economic analysis of
law on European legislation and court decisions has been negligible. 6
Although it appears that the movement is currently under-appreciated
in Europe, the authors believe there is tremendous opportunity for its
future application on that continent.
This Essay will examine the reasons why the economic
analysis of law has not flourished in European countries as it has in
the United States. In particular, this Essay will focus on three
European countries-the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.
Each of these countries has a different culture, legal system, and legal
3. Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17
INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3,4 (1997).
4. Cf Robert Berg, Camels West, SAUDI ARAMCO WORLD, May-June 2002, available
at http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200203/camels.west.htm. Camels were brought
to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. After they were employed in a number of
enterprises, including the short-lived U.S. Army Camel Corps, they were released into the
wild. They failed to adapt successfully to their new environment and eventually disappeared
from the landscape. Id.
5. See Lionel Montagnd, Law and Economics in France, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 150, 150-51 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
(examining the reasons why law and economics has not been thoroughly embraced in the
French legal system), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.con/0325book.pdf; see also lric
Brousseau, Did the Common Law Bias the Economics of Contract... and May It Change?,
in LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 79 (Bruno Deffains & Thierry Kirat eds.,
2001) (arguing that both civil law doctrine and the economics of contract law could benefit
by cross-fertilization), available at http://www.brousseau.info/en/publications/index.
php?req=29; Ugo Mattei & Robert Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries:
A Comparative Approach, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1991) (arguing that the
economic analysis of law could easily be transplanted into civil law countries).
6. Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11
INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 277,277 (1991).
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academy, which have led to different degrees of success in the
application of economic principles in the analysis of law.
II. EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
The economic analysis of law has played a significant role
within the U.S. legal academy as well as in the development of the
country's legal system. The U.S. legal academy has engaged in a
dynamic interdisciplinary debate for decades-the most notable
example of this process is the law and economics movement.7
Scores of articles have been written analyzing American legal
doctrines and statutes from an economic perspective. 8 Proponents of
the economic analysis of law hold prestigious appointments to the
federal bench, including Court of Appeals Judges Richard Posner and
Frank Easterbrook, and Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and
Stephen Breyer.9 Why has the economic analysis of law prospered in
the United States? An examination of the American culture, legal
system, and legal academy yields many insights.
A. The American Culture and Legal System: The Protection of
Rugged Individualism
Forged on the North American frontier, American culture is
defined by the rugged individualism and autonomy of classic
Lockean liberalism. Liberalism holds that citizens are inevitably
self-interested. 10 Molding the citizenry towards a common good is a
waste of time because one cannot remove self-interest, and in fact,
diversity of interest precludes anything like a common good. The
goal of classic liberalism is to encourage citizens to pursue their own
views and goals.11  Liberalism also holds that individuals are
7. See Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and
Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIs 66, 66 (2004); see also Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded
House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Law and Economics
Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 35-37 (2004); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture
and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 23, 29-30 (1989).
8. See Posner, supra note 7, at 66 n.1.
9. CENTO VEJANOVSKI, THE ECONOMICS OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 26
(1990).
10. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING
THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 64 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 1966) (1690) ("[Y]et men,
being biased by their interest ... .
11. See id. at 63-66.
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endowed with certain natural rights that are reserved by the
individual in the social contract and not dependent on the government
for their legitimacy. 12 This view of the social contract differs from
the French version, which will be discussed shortly, in which all
individual rights are given up to the state and then returned to the
individual. 13 Moreover, since our experience as a British colony,
Americans have been "suspicious" of big government and, therefore,
strongly believe in limited government and decentralized decision-
making. 14
These features of American culture make the United States a
receptive environment for application of economic analysis to law.
Neoclassical economic analysis is based on individual, rational
decision-making, 15 akin to the individual decision-making revered by
classic liberalism. Moreover, the logic of neoclassical economic
analysis supports decentralized decision-making by market
participants, with minimal government interference, as a means of
maximizing efficiency. 16 This logic is consistent with both the
American distrust of government power and our constitutional
system of protecting individual rights from government intrusion.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that legal problems of interest to
Americans are readily amenable to economic analysis.
Consistent with Lockean liberalism, the protection of
individual rights in America is a key feature of the U.S.
Constitution-as most notably exhibited in the Bill of Rights. The
government is prevented from infringing upon these individual rights
and, in the event they are infringed, the courts must decide their
limits and the means to protect them properly. As a result of
Americans' suspicion of big government, the U.S. Constitution
created three separate and distinct branches of the federal
government, each enjoying relatively equal distribution of power
through a system of checks and balances. This system was
established to protect individual rights-and the states-from
encroachment by the federal government. The judiciary enjoys a
relatively powerful role due to its ability to review legislation and
strike down that which it deems to violate the Constitution. 17
12. See id. at 43.
13. See infra Part III.A.3.
14. See DEREK BOK, THE STATE OF THE NATION: GOVERNMENT AND THE QUEST FOR A
BE'TTER SOCIETY 11 (1996).
15. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 10-12; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003).
16. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 3.
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the judiciary's
position as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of legislation).
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The relative strength and fluidity of the American judiciary
seem to have provided significant impetus for the growth of the
economic analysis of law in the American experience. 8 Given their
position of relative strength in our system of checks and balances,
American judges are allowed, perhaps even compelled, to be more
creative than their European counterparts. Even in comparison with
their British common law cousins, American judges are "considered
far more adventurous."' 19 Furthermore, decisions by U.S. judges are
less likely to be overturned by subsequent legislation. The American
system of checks and balances presents more obstacles to legislation
designed to countermand a court decision than the European
parliamentary systems. 20
Moreover, the legal profession is extremely fluid. In the
United States, it is
altogether natural for a lawyer in the course of his
career to be a professor, a practicing attorney, a judge,
and even a politician .... [T]his fluidity of roles has
enabled a number of law professors identified with the
law and economics movement to become consultants,
practitioners, government officials, judges, and even
Supreme Court Justices. 21
Some of the movement's best-known scholars, including
Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, have been appointed to the
bench. 22 This constant movement of people within the American
legal profession facilitates the cross-fertilization of law by other
disciplines, most notably by economics. 23
America's common law system is also widely believed to
have facilitated the growth of the law and economics movement. It is
presumed that a common law system is more efficient than a civil
18. See Posner, supra note 3, at 3-4.
19. Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An
Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 295 (1996); see also,
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. CHI.
ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000) (using a comparative empirical analysis to establish that American
judges exercise greater discretion than their European siblings).
20. Under the American system of checks and balances, laws must be approved by the
House, Senate, and President to become law, and they are subject to filibuster. Under the
British parliamentary system, laws can be passed merely with the approval of one house of
parliament. The German parliamentary system has two houses and the French Presidential-
Parliamentary system has two houses and holds the possibility of a split in party allegiance
between the President and the Parliament; however, in practice both of these systems
generally offer an easier time for the passage of corrective legislation than the American
system of checks and balances. See Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 295-96.
21. Posner, supra note 3, at 3-4; see also Posner, supra note 7, at 76-77.
22. VEUANOVSKI, supra note 9, at 26.
23. Posner, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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law system because
the common law is designed to give effect to private
bargains with minimum active interference from the
state ... and . . . common law rules tend to become
precedential only to the extent that they are efficient
[because] . . . more efficient rules are upheld while
less efficient ones are overruled. 24
Moreover, the role of the judge in the common law system is more
extensive than that in a civil law system. Under a common law
system, judges interpret statutes and constitutions while
"discovering" the common law that prevails in the absence of
relevant legislation. Under a civil law system, the judge is merely the
"mouthpiece for the law," interpreting the legal rights and
relationships that are established by the legislature in the code.25
B. The American Legal Academy
The American legal academy combines student graduate
study with a professionally trained professorate in a way that
provides little cover for an entrenched philosophy of legal discipline.
In the United States, students typically undertake study for a three-
year graduate legal degree (J.D.) after they have already successfully
completed a four-year undergraduate degree. Traditionally,
American law professors had no education beyond the same three-
year graduate degree conferred upon all attorneys and were drawn
from legal practice. The demands of law school hiring committees
are changing in this regard, in no small part due to the success of the
law and economics movement.26 However, at the time of the rise of
the law and economics movement in the United States during the
1960s and 1970s, the American academy combined a relatively well-
educated student body that had been exposed to a variety of academic
disciplines with a faculty that had a relatively small investment in
any particular academic perspective or school of thought. This
combination provided fertile ground for the spread of economic
analysis in the American academy in that it provided both students
24. Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 993, 1015 (1990).
25. See M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 170
(Thomas Nugent trans., George Bell & Sons 1906).
26. The attainment of an additional graduate degree in law, or even a Ph.D. in another
discipline, is an increasingly important credential for young legal academics in America,
while prior legal practice has declined in importance. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected
Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal
Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 403,414-15 (2004).
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who had the undergraduate preparation for instruction in such theory
and a professorate who were not overly wedded to existing legal
philosophy.
Further undermining the entrenchment of the academic status
quo in the United States is the fact that American legal scholarship is
published in an exceedingly large number of primarily student-edited
journals. Because the vast majority of U.S. journals are student-
edited, legal scholars do not need to convince a fellow professor,
steeped in the arguments of the prevailing legal discipline, that an
article is important in order to get it published. Only student editors
need be convinced. Articles in student-edited journals are published
not because they support the traditional legal discipline but because
they are interesting, novel, or controversial. Accordingly, it is
relatively easy for new ideas from a variety of disciplines to find their
way into the American legal literature.
Finally, just prior to the rise of the law and economics
movement in the United States, the American legal academy
experienced a void in legal theory. During the middle of the
twentieth century, the logic of legal formalism gave way to the
empirical demands of legal realism in the United States. 27  Rather
than divining the inherent logic of the law from disparate appellate
opinions, the American legal academy became increasingly
concerned with documenting the reality of the law in practice. At the
same time, scholarship in philosophy undermined the traditional
normative underpinnings of American legal thought.2 8 This decline
in formalism and traditional normative theory created an opportunity
for the rise of the economic analysis of law in the American legal
academy. 29 Not only was the structure of the American legal
academy amenable to change, but the American legal academy felt
27. See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 453-54 (1974).
Once upon a time there was Formalism. The law itself was a deductive system,
with unquestionable premises leading to ineluctable conclusions. It was,
potentially at least, all consistent and pervasive ....
Then, out of the hills, came the Realists.... they were much more interested in
the way law actually functioned in society .... The critical questions were
henceforward no longer to be those of systematic consistency, but of existential
reality.
Id.; see also Ulen, supra note 26, at 403.
28. Leff, supra note 27, at 454-55.
29. See UGO MATrEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 85 (1997).
[Olne of the reasons for the success of law and economics in America was the
need for 'reconstruction' after years of realist jurisprudence had reduced legal
scholarship to little more than a sterile commentary on case law. Law and
economics was seen as a tool for thinking about the law in broad theoretical
terms, giving scholars back their role as social engineers.
Id. (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1983)).
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the need to borrow from economics and other disciplines in order to
fill the gaps in its own disciplinary perspective. Among all of the
disciplines that the law has borrowed from, economics is the most
important. "The moving force of this change is not all of the 'law
and' developments of the last twenty years but one particularly-law
and economics." 30
C. Why the Economic Analysis of Law Has Succeeded in the
United States
The American cultural and legal landscapes have proven
fertile ground for the law and economics movement. The
neoclassical model of individual rational decision making through
decentralized markets strikes a harmonious cord with American
individualism and our distrust of centralized government power.
Moreover, our system of governmental checks and balances and
common-law adjudication makes for a relatively strong and
adventuresome judiciary that is more likely to be subject to
evolutionary pressure towards efficient legal rules or to decide cases
on the basis of public policy. Finally, the history and structure of our
legal academy allows for a wide-open scholarly debate that
incorporates facets from many disciplines. Thus, it is not surprising
that the careers of the greatest theorists in the law and economics
movement, including Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi, and Richard
Posner, have taken place in the United States.
I1. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN EUROPE
Although Europeans are curious about the law and economics
movement, its impact on their legal environment has been
comparatively slight, especially in the civil law countries. Few
European universities offer classes strictly devoted to the study of the
economic analysis of law.3 1 Additionally, the study of law and
economics is not generally incorporated into traditional law
courses. 32 Articles employing the economic analysis of law are
30. Ulen, supra note 26, at 405.
31. In Germany, for instance, only law schools in Hamburg, Munich, Oldenburg, and
Hanover offered courses in law and economics in 1993. Thomas Henne, Environmental
Policy in Germany and the United States, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 207, 226 n.84 (2003)
(reviewing SuSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF
PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995)).
32. Cf Kirchner, supra note 6, at 279-80 (discussing the relatively minor influence of
the economic analysis of the law as of 1991 in Germany).
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relatively rare in the European academy, and there is only one
European journal dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law. 33
Economic analysis is fairly uncommon in European cases outside its
traditional stronghold of antitrust, and there are no comparable
judicial appointments of law and economics scholars to the bench as
there has been in the United States. Of the three countries profiled in
this Essay, law and economics has been most successful in England
and least successful in France. An examination of the cultures, legal
systems, and legal academies of these various countries, in light of
our analysis of the success of law and economics in the United
States, will yield insight into these observations.
A. European Culture and Legal Systems: Cultured Collectivism
1. The United Kingdom: A Proud Tradition of Collective
Laissez-Faire
The British have a strong class hierarchy. Unlike in the
United States, where wealth and social stature can be attained
through individual achievement, wealth and social stature in England
are traditionally determined at birth.34 Class organization is strong
within, but not between, the classes. The organized working class
has little trust in the upper class, which includes much of the British
legislature and judiciary. 35
The British are more invested in history and tradition than
Americans, even though both countries follow the common law
system. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has no
written constitution. The British constitution is not the outcome of a
revolution as in France and the United States. Instead, it is a
historical constitution to which only gradual changes have been made
over centuries. The British have always looked to their inheritable
past and time-honored traditions to determine the scope of their
laws.36
33. Posner, supra note 7, at 66.
34. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan Under the
Bargaining Model, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 117, 137 (2000) (citing HENRY BROWN, THE
ORIGINS OF TRADE UNION POWER 208-09 (1983)).
35. Id.
36. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 27-28 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., 1987) ("The [Glorious] Revolution [of 1689] was made to preserve our ancient,
indisputable laws and liberties and that ancient constitution of government which is our only
security for law and liberty .... All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded
upon the principle of reverence to antiquity."); see also COLIN TURPIN, BRITISH
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Parliamentary sovereignty reigns in the United Kingdom.
There, Parliament is comprised of a compound body made up of the
Crown, the Lords, and the Commons. 37  Nothing is above
Parliament. Parliamentary sovereignty has facilitated a strong
legislature at the expense of the executive and judiciary;
consequently, even though the British have a common law system,
the judges have only a limited role in the interpretation of the law.
Generally, British courts may only interpret Acts of Parliament and
do not have the power to declare an Act unconstitutional. 38 This is
an important distinction from U.S. courts, which have the authority to
declare any statute unconstitutional.
2. Germany: Human Rights in a Well-Ordered System of Co-
Determination
Due to their experience in World War II, modem Germans
place the utmost importance on human rights and collective
cooperation. German law values people as humans rather than
commodities. Moreover, the Germans have organized their society
in a way that allows for the state mediation of interests among
groups. For instance, Germany regulates its industrial relations
system to encourage nationwide collective bargaining between labor
and management in an environment of cooperative consultation and
exchanges of information. 39 The net result is a more cooperative and
productive system of industrial relations, with fewer work stoppages
than in the United States and the United Kingdom.40
While Germany does have a separation of powers doctrine,
historic events have modified this doctrine to grant more power to the
legislature, at the expense of the executive and the judiciary.
Although the German judiciary is independent, its discretion is
generally limited to the interpretation of the civil code enacted by the
legislature.4 1 "German law courts tend to stay within the boundaries
GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 4-5, 11 (5th ed. 2002).
37. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
407 (10th ed. 1959) (1885); see also Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts 1998/80042--a.htm#1.
38. See Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A Summary of Recent Constitutional Reform
in the United Kingdom, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 71, 75 (2005). As a member of the
European Union, however, Britain's courts must now reconcile any Acts of Parliament
enacted subsequent to January 1, 1973 that conflict with European Court of Justice
interpretations of EU law in force in the United Kingdom. Id. Judges may also fill in holes
in the British law left by Parliament. See TURPIN, supra note 36, at 48.
39. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 34, at 146.
40. Id.
41. See Kirchner, supra note 6, at 283.
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of traditional leal reasoning to keep their factual autonomy vis-a-vis
the legislature. "&2 To invite frequent legislative countermands would
undermine the independent authority of the courts in the eye of the
public. Thus, like their British counterparts, German judges are
limited in their ability to bring external value judgments into their
decision making because of the ease with which the legislature can
overturn a judge-made legal rule.43
Not only does the threat of parliamentary override limit the
role of German judges but the very nature of a civil law system also
narrows judicial discretion. Under a common law system, the "judge
is somehow expected to judge" whereas in civil law systems, the
code is expected "to have already judged."' 44 Civil law "judges are
not to be the cheerleaders for capitalism" but, instead, they should
passively and mechanically enforce the law without regard to the
wealth or social class of the parties. 45 Values of fairness and equity
tend to be more important under civil law systems than the efficiency
that often influences U.S. common law decisions. 46
3. France: "Libert6, Egalit6 et FratemitW!" dans une Soci~t6 de
Confrontation et de Conflit
The effect of the French Revolution was to overthrow the
class-based system and to create national sovereignty. 47 Unlike
England, the French cultural and legal landscape is not predicated on
class. The French do not focus on individual self-interest but rather
the common good of society. "[L]aws are supposed to primarily
organize relationship [sic] among people in order to avoid negative
externalities and to ensure public order."48
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id.
44. Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A
Project in Progress, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 471, 471 (quoting Interview with Jean-Frangois
Lyotard in New Haven, Conn. (Jan. 1992)).
45. Posner, supra note 7, at 76.
46. Horacio Spector, Fairness and Welfare from a Comparative Law Perspective, 79
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 521, 539 (2004). In contract disputes, French courts are less willing to
allow the parties to renegotiate the terms of a contract and are more willing to grant specific
performance over efficient breach because these doctrines will guarantee the fairness of the
contract. By contrast, American courts are more flexible and apply the doctrine that will
provide the most efficient outcome. See Brousseau, supra note 5, at 4.
47. A nation "is a body of associates, living under a common law, represented by the
same legislature, etc." Emmanuel Joseph Siey~s, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 92, 97 (Michael Sonenscher trans., 2003).
48. Brousseau, supra note 5, at 5.
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The French cultural and legal landscape has been shaped by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of the social contract.4 9 Under
Rousseau's social contract, all people form an association by giving
to the community all of their individual rights. No rights are reserved
to the individual. In return, the community provides order and gives
back these rights to its citizens guaranteeing the rights in the social
contract. The community defends and protects the people and their
goods.50  The sovereign-in this case, the nation-creates an
ordering system to determine what is right for the common good of
the community. 5 1 Because law is an expression of the general will, it
is not subject to judicial review. It is the law that decides the division
of rights and not the courts.
France, like Germany, is a civil law system. Common law
was shunned because it "was identified with the losing side" of the
French Revolution. 52 Judges were viewed with suspicion because
they had upheld the class-based ancien rdgime by regularly
overruling bourgeois reforms. The "revolutionaries . . .wanted to
uproot 'medieval' practices and replace them with 'rational' ones.
The revolutionaries proclaimed that law derived its authority from
the popular will as expressed through legislators, not from social
norms as found by judges."53
B. The European Academy
In general, European legal education combines undergraduate
study for future practicing lawyers with extensive academic
preparation for the professorate. In France and Germany, a law
diploma is an undergraduate degree taught by highly professional
scholars with graduate degrees beyond the initial law degree.
Although the traditional method of legal education in the United
Kingdom is by reading for the bar, recently the British have adopted
legal education through formal undergraduate education at degree-
granting institutions. European law professors, on the other hand,
undergo not only years of undergraduate study, but also years of
practicum and graduate study, emerging from the end of a long
process with degrees and training that would be the American
49. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Donald A. Cress ed. &
trans., 1987).
50. Id. at 23-25.
51. Id. at 25-26.
52. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1650 (1996).
53. Id. at 1650-51.
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equivalent of a Ph.D. in law. As a result, in comparison with their
American colleagues, European law professors teach students who
have less preparation in other disciplines, and European professors
are more heavily invested in existing legal scholarship.
Institutional features of the European academy further
entrench disciplinary practices and ideals. Publication by European
legal scholars is mostly in faculty-edited books or journals. There are
fewer European journals overall and only one European journal is
dedicated solely to the economic analysis of law.54 Very few of the
general journals publish articles by law and economics scholars. 55
Tenure, at least in France, is granted on a national, rather than an
institutional, basis. Review is undertaken through a unitary national
process and review committee. As a result, new approaches in the
analysis of law must receive approval from scholars invested in the
existing body of scholarship before they can be published or earn
their author tenure.
Finally, formalism did not suffer the same precipitous decline
in Europe that it did in the United States. The conception of "legal
science" in continental Europe consists of a massive body of legal
scholarship that can trace its roots all the way back to Roman law and
which is considered such an important backdrop for the drafting of
modern legal codes that all legal arguments generally start, and
finish, with this body of accumulated wisdom.56 Although the legal
realist movement made a strong challenge to formalism in Germany
in the 1920s and 1930s, the movement became associated with the
Nazi regime and accordingly suffered in its consideration by modern
European legal theorists.' European scholars of course recognize
that strict formalism is not a completely accurate view of the
development of law, but because this school of thought did not suffer
the same precipitous decline it suffered in America, there has been no
similar void in the discipline of law for the law and economics
movement to fill. European legal academic institutions are less open
to change because the law is already an established discipline and
scholars are not necessarily looking to supplement it with other
disciplines. Accordingly, in Europe, the discipline of law has
suffered less of a crisis of confidence, and there has been less need
for legal theorists to borrow from other disciplines, including
54. Posner, supra note 7, at 66.
55. See Henne, supra note 31, at 226 n.85 (discussing the situation in Germany).
56. See generally Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31
B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990).
57. See Robert Cooter & James Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries:
Past, Present, Future, 11 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 261,262 (1991) (citing Kirchner, supra note
6, at 284).
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economics.
C. Why Europe Has Not Been Fertile Ground for the Economic
Analysis of Law
The relative lack of success of the economic analysis of law
in Europe to date can be traced to characteristics of European culture,
legal systems, and the European legal academy.
In general European culture is more communitarian and
steeped in history and tradition than American culture. European
society is more state-oriented and less trusting of the market.5 8 As a
result, the analysis of legal problems from the perspective of
individual rational actors seems curious from the perspective of many
Europeans. British culture organizes its society and law more around
the traditional interaction of social groups than rational individual
action. For example, for years the British tolerated one of the most
inefficient industrial relations systems in the industrialized world,
based on work days lost to industrial strife, due to their acceptance of
a tradition of class conflict through industrial strife. 59 Similarly, the
Germans' commitment to human rights causes them to disdain
express discussions of the value of human life and the efficient level
of medical care or regulation. 60 However, perhaps the French pose
the best example of a communitarian society with their commitment
to national sovereignty and the social contract as envisioned by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. The French conception that the nation-state
adopts a system of order and law is inconsistent with the assumptions
of the normative equality among all activities and the valuation of
entitlements based on willingness to pay implicit in the neoclassical
economic model. 61 Moreover, the French do not focus on individual
58. See John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public
Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (2001) (discussing state orientation in Germany and
France).
59. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 34, at 139-40 (arguing that because of Britain's social
class structure and the perceived lack of community interest among the classes, the working
classes have traditionally been unwilling to entrust labor relations reforms to Parliament,
which they perceive as upper class. Thus, for a major industrial country, labor relations in
Great Britain remain largely unregulated).
60. This statement is based on Professor Dau-Schmidt's seminar discussions with
German students at the Institut flir Internationales Recht, Christian-Albrechts-Universitt on
the value of human life and efficient safety regulation.
61. For example, in his lectures at Universit6 Panth6on-Assas (Paris II) concerning the
Coase theorem, Professor Dau-Schmidt found that his French students were particularly
skeptical of Coase's claim of the reciprocity of harm. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-4 (1960). Similarly, Gary Becker's notion of the efficient
level of crime based on an implicit valuing of the benefits of crime to the criminal makes no
sense to the French. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
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exchange and efficiency but rather on fairness and equity. "The
rationality of the economic agent who is perfectly aware of prices,
and operates calculated choices in order to maximize his pleasure at
the least cost, is a disconcerting model for one who searches
solutions [sic] in equity and not in utility."62
European legal systems also are less amenable to the
economic analysis of law than the American system. The European
parliamentary systems allocate more power to the legislature, and
less to the judiciary, than the American system. Under British
parliamentary sovereignty, the word of Parliament is supreme.
Similarly, Germany's separation of powers doctrine allocates power
to the legislature at the expense of the judiciary. Although the
German judiciary is independent, it is very careful not to "invoke
external values or consideration of public policy" and risk losing its
autonomy from the legislature. 63 As a result, the use of social
sciences has met with great resistance when such arguments have
been raised in legal interpretation. 64
The European civil law systems generally provide a more
limited role for judges. "Civil law reasoning typically starts from
abstract premises and concepts and, therefore, gives little room to the
kind of consequentialist, forward-looking reasoning on which law
and economics relies." 65 Ostensibly, civil law judges only interpret
the law because the law itself, as written by the nation, has already
judged.66 Although European scholars recognize that in reality even
merely "reading" a statute can involve important policy decisions, the
rhetoric of European legal practice in the civil systems is that all of
the policy decisions have already been addressed by the legislature. 67
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
62. Montagn6, supra note 5, at 154.
63. Kirchner, supra note 6, at 285.
64. Id. at 284-85.
65. Spector, supra note 46, at 536.
66. de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, supra note 44, at 471 (quoting Interview with Jean-Franqois
Lyotard, in New Haven, Conn. (Jan. 1992)).
67. Dawson and Merryman believe that French judges go beyond strict formalism in
their decisions but do so:
* . . behind the scenes, behind the veil of the formal French judicial decision:
French judges do approach cases with a certain pragmatic concern for realism,
equity, and justice. On the other hand, the dominant, rigid French conception
of adjudication requires that French judges mask their pragmatism, forcing
them to operate under the table. This cuts French judges off from each other,
preempting any reasoned and collective application of caselaw techniques. The
result is a combination of frustratingly formalist decision making and closeted,
individual, ad hoc, unprincipled, and unconstrained judicial pragmatism.
Id. at 473 (citing JOHN P. SAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 375, 409-10 (1968); JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 151 (1969)).
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As a result, express policy-based arguments, like those used in
economic analysis, generally are not welcome. Even though the
British have a common law system that is the precursor of our own,
the role of judges is more limited in the British system. Because of
parliamentary sovereignty, judges are less likely to be adventurous
and stray too much from time-honored traditions. 68 They tend to rely
more on the doctrine of stare decisis than their American common
law counterparts, which leaves little room for policy analysis. 69
Moreover, the relationship of the judiciary to practitioners
and academics in Europe, and the lack of fluidity among these three
forms of practice, may also contribute to the slow growth of the law
and economics movement in Europe. The British legal profession
"has been notoriously unwilling to admit the relevance of social
science" to the discipline.70 "The English legal fraternity is wary of
theory, contemptuous of experts and academics, and reluctant to
accept the idea that other disciplines have something valuable to say
about 'law.' 71 In Germany, the legal academy is under the influence
of the judiciary. The German Ministry of Justice limits the number
of students admitted to the study of law, writes and administers the
state law exams for admission to practice, and supervises the training
of law students during their apprenticeships after the first state
exam.72 The German judiciary's cautionary relationship with the
social sciences has prevented economic analysis from becoming an
integral part of their legal academy. 73 Lastly, a European legal
scholar is unlikely to move from professor to practicing attorney, to
judge, and to legislator. In Germany and France, for instance, the
judiciary is a separate profession. "The isolation and the relative
political impotence of European judiciaries have contributed to their
formalist approach, in which law is conceived of as a technical,
autonomous discipline sealed off from other fields, such as
economics." 74
Finally, the structure of the European legal academy has been
less amenable to the growth of the law and economics movement in
68. Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 295.
69. Spector, supra note 46, at 537.
70. VEUANOVSKI, supra note 9, at 11 (quoting A.J. Ogus & G. Richardson, Economics
and the Environment: A Study of Private Nuisance, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284 (1977)).
71. Id. at 12.
72. See Kirchner, supra note 6, at 284; see also Philip Leith, Legal Education in
Germany: Becoming a Lawyer, Judge, and Professor, 4 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 3-
4, 9 (1995), available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles4/leith4.html. "The Ministry of
Justice has an important part in the education of lawyers. Some might say that it has a more
important role than that of many law professors who . . . have no direct input to the
examination process which will award degrees to students." Id. at 4-5.
73. See Kirschner, supra note 6, at 284 (discussing the slow adoption of sociology).
74. Posner, supra note 3, at 5.
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Europe. The Europeans are heavily invested in law as an
autonomous discipline and are quite happy with the academic
product they produce. Although there is certainly interest in inter-
disciplinary research, the Europeans perceive no intellectual void or
disciplinary crisis of confidence that they must fill with the economic
analysis of law. Moreover, the European systems of publication in
faculty-edited journals and national tenure help to reinforce the
entrenched academic establishment. In order for new methods of
analysis to make it into European scholarship, they have to gain at
least some acceptance by academics who have built their careers on
the status quo.
IV. THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPE
Although the economic analysis of law may never be as
important to Europeans as it is to Americans, it undoubtedly has
applicability to European legal problems and potential to grow in its
importance. No civil code is without its flaws. Scholars have long
known that "the official and perfectly formalist conception of passive
adjudication on the basis of the unproblematic application of the
Codes' grammar is ...no longer ...tenable . . . ."75 Civil law
judges often have to fill these holes in the code with policy-based
rules, although this process is often hidden from public view.
Moreover, civil law systems increasingly rely on case law as well as
statutes and regulations outside of the code to resolve disputes. 76
Economic analysis can be a valuable tool in making such decisions.
If law and economics is to be accepted in European countries,
especially in those where the judiciary is not on equal footing with
the legislature, then the economic analysis of law must permeate not
only judicial interpretation but also the legislation. Although it is
true that even civil law judges inevitably make policy decisions in
reading the code and deciding cases, within the European legal
environment arguments that present express policy considerations are
more appropriately made to the legislature. If economic analysis of
law is openly considered and applied by the legislature, then these
arguments will become important to European judges and academics.
The economic analysis of law may also become more
important to Europeans as the European Union continues to extend
its regulatory coverage. As European countries continue to work
75. de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, supra note 44, at 488.
76. Mattei & Pardolesi, supra note 5, at 268-69. For example, a body of case law has
been developed for nuisance law in France and product liability law in Germany. Id. at 269.
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together within the Union, they will need a common language to
unite their regulatory efforts and objectives. Although the language
of the law may differ among European countries, the "language of
economics . . . is . . . universal . . . .77 Moreover, although its
structures were crafted in light of the more state-centered political
systems of Europe, the European Union was founded on the idea of
liberalizing markets among the Member States and has been
supported by pro-market scholars.78 Given its foundations in market
theory, it will be difficult for the European legal community to ignore
the success of law and economics in analyzing the legal problems
posed by the European Union.
The economic analysis of law may also enjoy more success in
Europe as alternatives such as behavioral law and economics and
socio-economics become more important in the law and economics
movement. 79 These alternatives to traditional neoclassical economic
analysis consider limits to human rationality and group dynamics that
may seem more realistic and appealing to European audiences. In
considering the legal questions posed by societies that are organized
more around the interaction of classes and groups in society,
Europeans may find the analysis of socio-economics more
compelling. Americans, too, are being drawn to these less traditional
economic analyses in examining legal questions. 80
While Europe currently lags significantly behind the United
States in the economic analysis of law, it is possible for this gap to be
reduced quickly. The success of the European Union may create the
opportunity for economic analysis to succeed first with the European
legislatures and then with the judiciary and academy. If the desire is
there, the talented and highly skilled European academy can quickly
assimilate this method of analysis. Moreover, because European
judges are generally recruited directly from law school, if the legal
academy were to develop a program of study in which economic
principles were consistently taught, these concepts would quickly
77. Posner, supra note 3, at 6.
78. See, e.g., Claus Offe, The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It Survive
European Integration?, II J. POL. PHIL. 437 (2003).
79. See, e.g., THOMAS ULEN & RUSSEL KOROBKIN, COGNITION, RATIONALITY, AND THE
LAW (forthcoming 2006); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051 (2000); LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH
(2005); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389 (1997).
80. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Pittsburgh, City of Bridges: Developing a Rational
Approach to Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 38 LAW & SoC'y REV. 199, 201 (2004);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Law and Economics, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 856, 859-60 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed.,
2002).
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enter the European judiciary. 81
Although the law and economics movement in Europe
currently suffers a fate similar to that of feral camels of the American
Southwest, perhaps now that the camel's nose is under the tent, we
will soon see more of this homely, yet useful, animal.
81. See Mattei & Pardolesi, supra note 5, at 271.
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